This research investigates how family events in adult children's lives influence the timing of their parents' financial transfers. We draw on retrospective data collected by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study and use event history models to study the effects of marriage, divorce and childbirth on the receipt of large gifts from parents. We find increased chances of receiving real estate at marriage and in subsequent years, at childbirth, but not in the event of divorce. Large gifts of money are received in the years of marriage and divorce, but not at childbirth. Our findings indicate that parental gifts are triggered by adult children's economic need, but also point to a plurality of transfer motives and meanings for parents, adult children and their relationships.
Introduction
Numerous studies have examined financial transfers that parents and children exchange inter vivos. Interest in inter vivos transfers has surged for several reasons: Unlike bequests, they require a conscious transfer decision from the giver; they are flexible in timing; they are hardly restricted by legal regulations or cultural norms; and they are part of an ongoing parent-child relationship (Kohli 2004) . A number of consistent findings have emerged from the literature on financial inter vivos transfers. In Western economies, these transfers are given at considerable rates and follow a downward pattern from the older to the younger generations. Parents remain net givers after retirement and even at very old age. This financial aid often appears to be targeted at children in economic need (McGarry and Schoeni 1997) .
Concerning the latter finding, one recurring theme in the literature is that parental transfers inter vivos are linked to important need-related events in adult children's lives. These connections are obvious: If parents, on the one hand, are motivated to help adult children "get a start in life," financial transfers will most likely be given at events such as marriage, childbirth or the beginning of employment. On the other hand, parental support may also be triggered when adult children experience adverse life events such as divorce, the loss of employment or the onset of a serious illness. Most quantitative studies of financial inter vivos transfers, however, neglect these links between life events and transfer timing. In addition, previous research has not considered that offspring might receive certain types of wealth at different stages in life. A son or daughter who has just married, for example, may receive transmission of real estate, whereas those who divorce are more in need of liquid assets to ease the financial strain.
Research on these issues is not only required to close gaps in the empirical literature on financial transfers, but also from a theoretical perspective on transfer behavior within families. The present study aims to extend prior research in three main ways. First, we analyze wealth transmission in families from a life course perspective. This approach allows examination of the influence of events in adult children's lives on the timing of parental transfers. Second, we also study the type of wealth that is transmitted at different transitions and the meanings of these transfers for parents, adult children and their relationships. That is, we do not restrict the analysis to children's economic need but also consider how non-material aspects of family ties may influence transfer behavior. Third, we relate the timing and types of transfers to the study of transfer motives. By considering these characteristics our study yields important additional information that contributes to the understanding of parents' motives.
Theoretical Background and Previous Research on Intergenerational Transfers
Economic research on transfer behavior typically seeks to infer the giver's motive. It is assumed that transfer decisions maximize the giver's utility, either as part of a strategy in an exchange game or because utility is derived from the recipient's utility (altruism). The information if giving is motivated by altruism or by strategic exchange is considered essential to predict how individuals will respond to changing conditions. Economists usually view transfer motives as competing and test one against the other. Such empirical tests typically concentrate on the division or distribution of transfers, mainly analyzing the relationship between the recipients' incomes and transfer chances and magnitudes. A negative relationship is consistent with altruistic models, whereas testing the exchange model is more complex because it makes no clear prediction regarding the direction of this relationship. The empirical evidence on gifts and bequests is mixed with numerous studies supporting each motive (e.g., Bernheim et al. 1985; Cox 1987; Wilhelm 1996; McGarry and Schoeni 1997) .
In contrast, sociologists reject the assumption that each individual holds a singular transfer motive. Different motives may be held at the same time and these motives may compete or overlap. In addition, sociological research considers how the "quality" of transfers affects social bonds: "For recipients, it makes a difference whether transfers from their family members are motivated by self-interest (only) or (also) by love, benevolence, generosity, or a sense of personal obligation." (Kohli and Künemund 2003:126) As a result, theoretical predictions about intergenerational transfers incorporate both need-related aspects and aspects beyond need, such as commitment to family and emotional closeness. Motives listed in the sociological literature refer to three categories that are assumed to jointly influence transfer behavior: affection, reciprocity and norms of responsibility (Doty 1986 ).
Motives and Timing of Transfers
In the following, we discuss two aspects that influence the timing of intergenerational inter vivos transfers: the recipient's need for support and the donor's wish to give. A third aspect refers to considerations of exchange, either strategic (Kotlikoff and Morris 1989; Bernheim et al. 1985) or governed by norms of reciprocity (Silverstein et al. 2002; Leopold and Raab 2011) , presuming that the timing of giving depends on past, current or future receiving. Our retrospective data on receiving transfers, however, do not allow reconstructing exchange processes. We therefore disregard models of intergenerational exchange in the present study.
In altruistic models, the timing of transfers depends on the recipients' need. Financial aid is only provided if parents recognize that their children require such support. McGarry's (1999) altruistic model considers transfer timing within a two-period framework. If the child does not experience income need in the earlier period, parents delay transfers and gather additional information about the child's permanent income. If the child is in need, however, parents respond by giving inter vivos transfers. From a life course perspective, economic need often occurs at transitions in education, employment or family. Qualitative evidence suggests that most parents relate their provision of financial transfers explicitly to their children's economic need that occurs at events such as marriage, starting a family or divorce (Ploeg et al. 2004) . Such findings support the altruistic model, indicating that transfers are triggered by recipients' needs.
From a sociological perspective on motives, the same observations point to transfer behavior that is governed by norms of responsibility. Such norms refer to a generalized expectation that parents and children should support each other (Gans and Silverstein 2006) . That is, parents feel obliged to help their children even in strained relationships and without expecting compensation. They will not make any transfers, however, unless the child requires support. As in altruistic models, the timing of intergenerational support that is motivated by norms of responsibility therefore depends on the recipients' need.
In contrast, transfers may also be triggered by the donor's wish to give. In economics, this alternative model has been termed "impure altruism." (Andreoni 1989) The idea is that the parent derives utility from a "warm glow of giving," rather than from the child's improved well-being. The warm glow could either come as an internal reward for helping children (Sober and Wilson 1998) , or as social approval received from others for acting generously or signaling income (Glazer and Konrad 1996) . In the sociological literature, giving that is not conditional on the recipient's need is primarily seen to reflect intergenerational attachment. In other words, material gifts convey love and appreciation towards children and thus entail qualities beyond individual utility functions.
If transfers are given in the absence of need, we may assume that parents are not concerned about timing their giving. From an economic perspective on social approval, however, the act of giving should be visible to others, for example, at events like a child's marriage or the birth of grandchildren. From a sociological perspective, these events may trigger the parents' wish to give out of "affective solidarity" (Bengtson and Roberts 1991) toward the child's family.
Type of Wealth Passed Down
The simplest approach to deal with financial transfers of different types is to treat them all as substitutes and consider only their total present value (McGarry 1999). Arrondel and Masson (2001) proposed a more refined life-cycle typology of early human capital investments, later cash assistance and eventual wealth transmissions that have different determinants and correspond to different transfer motives. This typology, however, refers to the age of the child rather than considering specific events in the child's life. In addition, parental transfers remain pure economic acts without meanings beyond the efficient distribution of resources within families.
The type of wealth that is passed down the generations, however, may serve as an indicator for transfer meanings beyond economic need. We therefore distinguish between two broad categories of larger financial transfers: gifts of money and gifts of real estate. Gifts of money, on the one hand, are the appropriate transfer currency to efficiently distribute family wealth across descendents with regard to their economic need. These gifts can be divided easily; they are not localized and they can often be used immediately without restraint. With regard to transfer meanings beyond need, money is a fairly anonymous currency rather than a tangible representation of family history. Gifts of real estate, on the other hand, may represent far more than just a monetary value. They symbolize family history and reflect processes of intergenerational reproduction as tangible family property is passed on (Gulbrandsen and Langsether 2003) . Beyond the economic act of giving, these transmissions may represent affirmations of kinship and indicate the givers' wish to promote family cohesion, ensure continuity and maintain geographic proximity (Tomassini et al. 2003) . Apart from these additional meanings, gifts of houses or land are localized and their (intended) usage is restricted. They are therefore less appropriate for easing a child's immediate financial strain.
Hypotheses on Family Events and Parental Transfers
In the present study, we concentrate on three events in adult children's lives that we expect to be important triggers of larger financial inter vivos transfers: marriage, childbirth and divorce. The event of marriage, on the one hand, indicates the economic need associated with starting a family. This need often occurs immediately after marriage, for example, if wedding expenses must be covered, and/or if the spouses have a desire for homeownership. The latter, however, does not necessarily occur immediately after marriage, but may be delayed a few years. Gifts that respond to economic need are consistent with the altruistic model but may also reflect norms of responsibility that parents translate into transfer behavior if the child's new family is in need. On the other hand, newly married couples are not necessarily in economic need and gifts at the event of marriage do not always respond (only) to need. Therefore, the event of marriage may also generate the parents' wish to (selflessly) give out of affection towards the enlarged family or to (selfishly) benefit from a warm glow of giving. Overall, the types of wealth given at a child's marriage should reflect this heterogeneity of transfer motives. Some transfers may be monetary, need-related and given immediately at marriage. Others may be home and land, entailing meanings beyond need, and given at the event of marriage, but also in the course of the following years. The mix of motives associated with the event of marriage leads us to expect increased chances of receiving large gifts from parents immediately after marriage (mainly gifts of money) and in the following years (mainly gifts of houses or land) (Hypothesis 1a) .
Until now we presumed that parental gifts in the event of marriage are targeted both at the child and his or her spouse. Alternatively, parents may intend to support only their own child, for example if they are concerned about protecting family property against the risk of a child's later divorce. That is, parents try to ensure that the gift only belongs to their child and is not divided between the spouses in the case of a divorce. In Germany, most married couples have legally regulated their wealth division according to the "community of acquisitions." That is, the increase in capital value of assets during marriage belongs to both partners. Wealth accumulated before marriage remains the property of the previous owner after divorce (if the wealth has not been consumed). If a child marries, parents can only avoid a later split if the gift is clearly targeted at their own child and if the child uses this transfer for saving purposes only. But a gift can only be assigned to the child's "starting capital" if it precedes the event of marriage. Therefore, parents' motives to keep family wealth within the own generational lineage should affect the timing of their transfers. Empirically, this implies that the chances of receiving a gift should increase before the event of marriage (Hypothesis 1b) .
Unlike marriage, the event of divorce should primarily concern motives related to immediate economic need. Children face divorce and lawyer costs; they lose household income and wealth; and they may experience the financial strain of single parenthood. Adverse consequences of divorce are most severe for women, who, on average, earn less and are more often granted sole custody. Financial aid from parents should be aimed at helping children through their divorce transition and at maintaining the former standard of living. We therefore expect increased chances of receiving large gifts of money from parents immediately after divorce, and we expect a stronger effect on women than on men (Hypothesis 2).
In the event of childbirth, we expect a constellation of parental motives similar to the event of marriage. The birth of a child, on the one hand, puts financial pressure on a household (direct costs, income loss due to a mother's reduced labor force participation, and the need for housing space) that could trigger gifts motivated by altruism or norms of responsibility. This pressure may even increase for subsequent births. Unlike in marriage, however, it appears less conventional to give a singular transmission of a large amount of money at childbirth. Parental gifts may instead be in kind or consist of a series of smaller, recurring financial transfers. With regard to less functional motives of giving, on the other hand, the birth of a child -in particular the first birth -guarantees the continuation of the generational lineage. Parental gifts could then symbolize a premium that represents the valuation of the generational lineage and the wish to strengthen kinship ties. In addition, gifts of houses at childbirth may be aimed at ensuring that the adult child's family stays geographically close to the grandparents (Tomassini et al. 2003) . In sum, both need-related aspects and less functional aspects lead us to expect that large gifts in the event of childbirth are primarily transmissions of real estate. In this respect, an alternative perspective comes from Evolutionary Biology: Older generations invest in offspring that further their genetic line (Clark and Kenney 2010) . Cox and Stark (2005) even hypothesized that parents "purchase" grandchildren. For example, if children delay childbearing until they can afford their own home, parents might speed up the process by the gift of a house. This would imply a gift prior to childbirth. Based on these considerations, we expect increased chances of receiving large gifts from parents in the year before a child is born and at childbirth. These gifts should primarily consist of transmissions of real estate (Hypothesis 3).
The standard set of covariates in most analyses of intergenerational transfers is comprised of factors at the individual and family level. First, a parent's resources are positively related to the provision of financial assistance (Hogan et al. 1993 ), whereas an adult child's declining economic need after the age of 30 is associated with a decrease in financial support received from parents (Cooney and Uhlenberg 1992) . Second, family structure shapes the assistance. The proportion of children receiving financial transfers decreases with increasing numbers of siblings as "competitors" for parental wealth (Killian 2004 ).
The German Context
As our analysis uses data from Germany, it is important to understand the specific historical and societal dimensions in which private transfer behavior is embedded. First, parents' birth cohort profoundly affects the amount of financial resources available in a family. The oldest among today's aging parents in Germany were still affected by war and inflation whereas younger cohorts represent a generation that grew up in periods of peace and sustained economic prosperity and was therefore able to accumulate larger amounts of wealth. A further historical distinction concerns economic systems, as chances to build private property were significantly lower in the former East German Democratic Republic (1949-90) compared to the Federal Republic of Germany (since 1949). The FRG had a market economy right from the start whereas the GDR was a socialist state that, for example, expropriated farmers and entrepreneurs in its first years. Because of its completely different political context until 1990, the former GDR is left out of the present study.
Second, parents' decisions about the distribution and division of inter vivos transfers are hardly restricted by German law. Gifts are highly private and siblings cannot claim statutory shares if a brother or a sister is the single beneficiary of a large parental transfer. 1 In contrast, inheritance legislation restricts unequal division of bequests, and legal heirs can always claim 50 percent of their intestate share. With regard to taxation, German law treats inter vivos transfers similar to bequests, granting considerable allowances, currently of 400,000 EUR per child and donor that can be fully claimed every 10 years. This generosity is most pronounced where the transmission of houses or land (or the money to purchase them) is concerned. These transfers are taxed considerably below their market value. As a result, transferring real estate inter vivos is an effective way for wealthy parents to spend down their estate and avoid later taxation of bequests.
Third, studying transfers of real estate requires consideration of the specific characteristics of the German housing market. Compared to most Western European countries and to the United States, home-ownership rates in Germany are low. About 42 percent of West German households live in owner-occupied homes. Home ownership is more common in rural and suburban areas than in nucleated towns (Kurz 2004) , partly due to lower prices for developed sites. Major factors influencing the low overall rate of homeownership are strict legal requirements for the quality of buildings that produce high average construction costs and market prices of houses compared to the broad supply and relatively low prices in the rental market. As a result, becoming a home owner is a challenging financial task in West Germany that often requires long periods of saving and taking up high mortgages. Therefore, financial support from parents is particularly welcome and often indispensable for access to home ownership in Germany (Kurz and Blossfeld 2004; Kurz 2004) . The taxation and further regulations favor inter vivos transfers of houses (Mulder and Wagner 1998) . German law allows parents to sign over their home to a child, retaining a lifelong right of habitation. Subsequently, the generations might share one household or live in separated spaces within the same building (e.g., parents reside in the "granny flat"). Coresidence of aging parents and their adult children is a common phenomenon in Germany. According to data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, almost one third of German parents ages 70 and older coresided with at least one adult child in 2004 (Hank 2007 ).
Data and Method
Our empirical analyses are based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, which is a large, representative household and individual study started in 1984 (Wagner et al. 2007 ). Several new subsamples were added in the following years, notably a major refreshment sample in the year 2000. SOEP covers a wide range of topics including careers, education, income, demographic developments, health, and use of time, as well as satisfaction and values. Each person in a household who is 17 years or older gives his or her own answers. In 2001, one page of the questionnaire was devoted to gifts and bequests. Respondents were asked: "Have you yourself ever inherited something or received a gift of great value? We are referring to gifts or inheritance of house or land, securities, investments, other forms of wealth or large amounts of money." Respondents who answered positively were further asked in which year the transfer was received; whether it was a gift or an inheritance; which type of wealth was transferred: (a) house, land, condominium, 2 (b) securities, (c) cash or bank deposits, (d) shares or ownership of a company, (e) other; its value at that time; and the giver: one or both parents, parents-in-law, grandparents, husband or wife, other. Information could be provided on up to three transfers.
A total of 22,351 respondents participated in the survey. For our analysis, we restrict this sample as follows. First, we exclude 7,338 respondents that lived in the GDR in 1989, removing 32.8 percent of the original sample. 3 Inclusion of these persons would lead to substantial heterogeneity in the sample with respect to intergenerational transfer patterns: Parents had significantly lower chances of building personal wealth, and the legal regulations on gift-giving and bequeathing differed from West Germany. The latter is also true in most immigrants' countries of origin. In addition, the main direction of financial transfer streams is less clear in migrant families. Financial support often flows upward, in particular if adult children living in industrialized countries help their parents in less developed countries of origin (Holst et al., forthcoming) . Our second sample exclusion therefore concerns 1,857 respondents who immigrated to West Germany, removing another 8.3 percent of the original sample size. Finally, we exclude 3,193 respondents born before 1940 because selective mortality could lead to bias in estimating transfer chances of older birth cohorts. This restriction reduces our sample to 9,963 persons (44.6% of the original sample size) ages 17 to 61.
Dependent Processes: Receiving a Transfer
As the year of transfer receipt was surveyed, we can reconstruct the age at which large inter vivos transfers were received. To analyze transfer chances, we construct episodes starting at birth and ending with an event at the age of receiving the first inter vivos transfer from parents. An episode is right-censored if a person has not received a transfer before the interview date. Furthermore, episodes are censored after the last parent has died.
In our sample, a total of 777 first gifts were reported, 570 of which came from parents. The latter number refers to all parental gifts, regardless of which type of wealth was transferred. This includes each type of wealth mentioned or a combination of two or more of these types. To allow separate analyses of gifts of real estate and gifts of money, we construct episodes for two additional dependent processes: The first ends with an event if the first gift received from the parents consisted only of real estate (house, land or condominium; n = 307 gifts). The second ends with an event if the first gift received from the parents consisted only of money or bank deposits (n = 189 gifts). In addition to censoring at the interview date and after the death of the second parent, episodes of both processes are censored if a gift consisting of any other type(s) of wealth was received.
Independent Processes: Marriage, Divorce and Childbirth
Our hypotheses referred to family events in adult children's life courses. To allow a dynamic modeling of these events, we use a series of time-varying dummy variables. A marriage at the age of 25, for example, is recorded as follows. Initially, a person is single.
During these years, all dummy variables for the marital biography (married, divorced, widowed) are zero. Therefore, single is the reference category of the marital biography. At the age of 24, a dummy variable indicating "one year before marriage" goes from zero to 1. At the age of 25, this dummy variable is reset to zero, and a dummy variable indicating the "year of marriage" goes to 1. At the age of 26, this variable is again reset to zero, while an additional dummy variable "one year after marriage" is set to 1. Finally, from the age of 27 onwards, this variable is again reset to zero, and another dummy variable "married > one year" goes to 1. The latter variable remains at (1) until the process time ends, unless the marriage ends by a divorce or widowing. If a respondent, for example, divorces at the age of 40, the dummy variable "married > one year" is reset from 1 to zero, and the variable "year of divorce" is set to 1. The subsequent years are modeled analogically to the event of marriage. If the respondent remarries at the age of 48, the dummy variable indicating "one year before marriage" is again set to 1 at the age of 47, etc. Therefore, this modeling technique does not differentiate between how many times marital events occur. It only indicates if they occur and if they influence transfer chances. The birth biography is measured in a similar way, with one important exception: The first birth is modeled as a separate process because the timing of first births often co-occurs with marriage. So, we define two sets of dummy variables: one refers only to first births, the other to subsequent births.
Covariates
As an indicator for parental resources, we use the father's score on the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (Ganzeboom et al. 1992) . The score on the ISEI scale, ranging from 16 to 90, is derived from information about the father's occupation when the respondent was 15 years old. In addition, we define a separate group of respondents who are daughters or sons of farmers. Although farmers score low on the ISEI scale, they often own property, a home and land. Concerning the number of siblings, the information surveyed in 2001 referred only to living siblings. As information on transfers was collected retrospectively, other siblings might still have been alive when the transfer was received. Therefore, we use the information collected two years later in 2003 which referred to all sisters and brothers even if deceased. As the distribution of this variable is right-skewed, we take the logarithm of the number of siblings plus one. Variables for birth cohort (linear) and gender are introduced as further controls.
Two variables have substantial shares of missing data. First, information about the father's occupation was not sufficient to assign ISEI scores in almost 40 percent of all cases. Second, information about the number of siblings could not be obtained from respondents who participated in the survey in 2001, but no longer in 2003 (13% of all cases). Listwise deletion of these cases could lead to biased estimates. Except for the few gaps in the marital history, we imputed all missing data by chained equations, producing five stacked sets of imputed data on which we run our analyses. The background model for the imputation includes all time-constant variables from the multivariate models and a number of auxiliary variables from the SOEP data. The parameter estimates and standard errors that are reported in our multivariate models were obtained by applying Rubin's rules (Rubin 1987) . Taking into account between-and within-imputation variation, this procedure avoids underestimating the magnitude of standard errors. For the imputation and the estimation of our models we use the Stata commands ice and mim (Royston 2009; Royston et al. 2009 ). Table 1 presents means and percentages of all variables at three points in the respondents' lives: at birth, at age 20 and at age 40. For each age, the first column shows the values before imputation and the second after imputation. The modeling of timevarying dummy variables is illustrated by the marital and birth biographies. At the age of 20, for example, 7 percent were in the year before marriage and 5 percent married. Another 3 percent were in the year after marriage and 4 percent had married two or more years before the age of 20. At the age of 40, the share of respondents who were married two or more years rises to 77 percent. Considering divorce, 1 percent were divorced at age 40 and 1 percent were experiencing their first year after divorce. Another 7 percent were divorced for two or more years at the age of 40.
Event History Analysis
For our multivariate analyses, we estimate transition rate models. The transition rate is the intensity of experiencing an event under the condition of not having experienced the event before (Blossfeld et al. 2007) . That is, the transition rate of receiving a large gift from parents is estimated under the condition that a respondent has not received such a transfer before and is still under observation. In all models, we allow for a time-dependent transition rate by including variables for age in linear and quadratic form. These variables are updated every two years. Episodes are split if any timevarying independent variable changed its value (for example, from "married > one year" to "year of divorce"). We use an exponential function to link the estimates to the dependent variable, the transition rate, ensuring that estimates of the propensity to receive a transfer are always positive: r(t) = exp(Aα)
Results
Figure 1 presents four survivor functions on the chances of receiving a transfer. These four curves represent different levels of parental resources: We assign respondents to three nearly equalsized groups according to their father's ISEI: a lower (ISEI < 31), an intermediate (31 ≤ ISEI ≤ 43), and a higher (ISEI > 43) status group. In addition, we define a separate group for daughters and sons of farmers. The curves indicate the proportion of persons in each group who have not received a transfer up to a certain age. People very rarely receive large gifts before the age of 25. Subsequently, all survivor curves start to fall. We observe the strongest decline, and therefore the best chances of receiving a gift, for sons and daughters of farmers. A strong decline is also observed for the group with higher ISEI scores compared to those with intermediate or lower scores. More than 20 percent of respondents with a high-SES father receive a large gift, compared to about 10 percent in the low-status group. Table 2 reports further descriptive information on the value of transfers. Considering large gifts from all sources, the median value is 31,500 Euros. Gifts from parents are larger than gifts from other sources, amounting to almost 45,000 Euros. With respect to different types of wealth that parents pass downward, the values vary markedly. For gifts consisting only of house, land or condominium, the median amount is almost five times as high as the amount of gifts consisting only of cash or bank deposits. Our multivariate models on marital events and the timing of transfers are presented in Table 3 . These models are organized as follows. Model 1a estimates the transition rate for all gifts, introducing all independent variables of the marital biography. In Model 1b, we add an interaction effect testing whether the effect of the "year of divorce" varies between men and women. Models 2 and 3 focus on different types of wealth: In Model 2, the dependent process is receiving the first parental gift consisting solely of real estate (house, land or condominium). Conversely, Model 3 only considers gifts of cash or bank deposits. For both models, we use the specification of Model 1a. 5 All models control for the respondents' age, gender and birth cohort, the father's occupational status, and the number of siblings.
The age effects, modeled by linear and quadratic terms, point to a bell-shaped pattern in the dependent process in all models. The transition rate at first increases, peaks at the age of 43 years, and decreases afterwards. This maximum rate is calculated from the first derivative of age (Model 1a). Hypothesis 1a posited elevated chances of receiving parental gifts after marriage. Furthermore, we expected that gifts of money are transferred immediately after marriage, whereas gifts of real estate also occur in the following years. The estimates from models 1a, 2 and 3 support this hypothesis.
Looking at all types of wealth (models 1a and 1b), we find a strong positive effect of the variable indicating the year of marriage. In this year, the transition rate is 3.2 times higher compared to single persons, all other things being equal. 4 In subsequent years, the effect size diminishes, but remains positive and significant even for respondents who are married more than one year. Models 2 and 3 present a more fine-grained picture of these effects. 6 As expected, gifts of real estate are received in the year of marriage, but also in subsequent years (Model 2). In contrast, increased chances of receiving monetary gifts occur only in the year of marriage (Model 3). In Hypothesis 1b, we further expected increased chances of receiving a large gift from parents before the event of marriage. Our corresponding estimates indicating the year before marriage point in the expected direction in all models. These effects, however, narrowly fail to reach the 5 percent significance level. After a child's divorce, we expected that parents respond immediately by giving large amounts of money (Hypothesis 2). Further, we assumed that this effect will be stronger for women. Looking again at all gifts (models 1a and 1b), our expectation regarding the immediacy of parental gifts is supported. Higher chances of receiving large gifts occur only in the year of divorce. In this year, the transition rate is 2.5 times higher compared to singles. The results for different types of wealth also support our reasoning. In Model 2, we do not observe any effect of the year of divorce on the 
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chances of receiving real estate, but Model 3 for gifts of money clearly reveals where the overall effect is rooted. Here, the effect of the year of divorce is strong and highly significant, indicating a transition rate that is 5.4 times higher compared to singles. Our expectation concerning gender differences, however, is not supported. The interaction effect in Model 1b is not significant, indicating that the increased chances of receiving gifts after divorce pertain to both men and women. Concerning the time-constant covariates, we find the expected effects for our indicators of parental resources and family structure: Respondents belonging to later birth cohorts have higher chances of receiving gifts in all models. These effects reflect the more favorable conditions under which their parents could accumulate wealth. These conditions seem to be particularly important for accumulating liquid assets, as the cohort effect is most pronounced in Model 3 for monetary gifts. The same applies for the father's occupational status (measured by ISEI scores). As already indicated by the descriptive results, occupational status is associated with increased chances of receiving large gifts. Again, this indicator for parental resources is most influential in gifts of money (Model 3), where the effect is three times larger compared to gifts of real estate (Model 2). These findings are consistent with the literature on wealth portfolios in different social strata which has shown that home-ownership is quite common even in lower strata (Kurz 2004) , whereas the possession of large amounts of liquid assets is a privilege of higher strata (Spilerman 2000) . The number of siblings, as expected, is negatively correlated with the chances of receiving transfers from parents. The only unexpected finding concerns gender differences. The estimate indicates that daughters are clearly disadvantaged in processes of intergenerational gift giving. The overall observation of the higher chances of receiving for sons (models 1a and 1b) is apparently attributable to gifts of real estate (Model 2), where the effect is particularly strong and highly significant.
Finally, the models presented in Table 4 test Hypothesis 3 on the effects of childbirth. Again, we estimate models for all gifts (4a, 4b), gifts of real estate (5a, 5b), and gifts of money (6a, 6b). In models 4a, 5a and 6a, we introduce the indicators from the birth biography instead of the indicators from the marital biography. In models 4b, 5b and 6b, all time-varying independent variables from the marital and birth biographies are included simultaneously. All models control for a common set of time-constant covariates and the time-varying information on age in linear and quadratic form (estimates not displayed in Table 4 ).
In Hypothesis 3, we expected increased chances of receiving large gifts before and after childbirth. Looking at all gifts, however, we do not observe any effects before or after the first birth (Model 4a). We find increased chances of receiving only in the year of later births. This coefficient remains statistically significant even after controlling for the marital biography (Model 4b). Again, we find notable differences with respect to different types of wealth: First, parental transfers in the year of later births mainly consist of transmissions of real estate: The estimates for the year of later births are positive and significant in models 5a and 5b, whereas childbirth does not elevate the chances of receiving large monetary gifts (models 6a and 6b). Second, Model 5a also indicates increased chances of receiving real estate in the year before the first birth and in the year of the first birth. If the marital and birth biography are introduced simultaneously (Model 5b), however, these effects disappear, whereas the estimates of the marital biography remain almost unchanged compared to Model 2.
Discussion
Prior research on financial inter vivos transfers largely neglected the links between life events and transfer timing. To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to systematically examine the relationship between family events in adult children's life courses and the timing of parental transfers. Our theoretical approach allowed for a plurality of givers' transfer motives and considered the meanings of different types of wealth for givers, receivers and their relationships. Our hypotheses posited that parents give financial transfers at the events of marriage, divorce and childbirth. First, we expected that parental wealth will be passed on before and after a child's marriage. We found support for Hypothesis 1a as transfer chances increase markedly in the year of marriage and remain at elevated levels in subsequent years. Higher chances of receiving large gifts of money are only observed in the year of marriage whereas real estate is also transferred with some delay. These findings cannot be linked to one specific transfer motive. Instead, they are broadly consistent with altruistic motives or norms of responsibility (assuming that marriage indicates economic need), as well as a warm glow of giving or intergenerational affection (assuming that the transfer relates to aspects beyond economic need). Hypothesis 1b focused on the year before a marriage, suggesting that parents transfer prior to their child's marriage in order to protect family wealth against the risk of divorce. The findings indicate that such considerations may play a role, although the estimates do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Second, we expected in Hypothesis 2 that chances of receiving large gifts from parents will increase immediately after divorce, and that the majority of these gifts will consist of money. Our empirical findings provide strong support for this hypothesis. We observe a substantial increase in chances of receiving only in the year of divorce. Further consideration of different types of wealth indicates that intergenerational wealth transmission in response to a divorce consists of liquid assets. These findings on the timing and type of transfers are clear evidence that parents respond to .001. N = 9,963. All models control for process time and time-constant variables (see Table 3 ). their children's economic need. Compared to the event of marriage, the plurality of possible motives is narrowed down considerably: Parents' monetary gifts in the year of a child's divorce are consistent with economists' models of altruism and the sociological notion of transfer behavior guided by norms of responsibility.
Our findings on marriage and divorce corroborate previous research on the timing of parental transfers. Qualitative evidence indicated that, in fact, the majority of financial transfers occur at transitions that motivate parents to help their children "build and rebuild secure lives and futures." (Ploeg et al. 2004:S131) Our hypothesis on elevated chances of receiving before and after childbirth, however, is only partly supported. We observed a robust effect only for the year of later births. As these transmissions appeared to consist mainly of real estate, one possible explanation is that parental gifts address adult children's need for living space. Regarding gifts of real estate, our estimates also pointed to increased chances of receiving before the first birth and in the year of the first birth. These effects, however, were less robust and disappeared after including the indicators of the marital biography. Nonetheless, the temporal proximity of marriage and first births do not allow to rule out the possibility that parental gifts are jointly triggered by an adult child's marriage and (the expectation of ) the birth of a grandchild.
There are some limitations to this study that should be noted. First, we analyzed the event of marriage but omitted consensual unions. As in many other industrialized countries, Germany has experienced a steady increase in consensual unions in recent decades. Consensual unions may be a prelude to marriage or, in particular in the United States, an alternative to marriage (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004) . Eggebeen (2005) found lower levels of support exchange between cohabiting adult children and their parents. Possible reasons are that parents might be reluctant to invest in children who live in fragile and unstable unions or that consensual unions lack the wedding ritual at which transfers are given. Our data did not allow investigating whether children's consensual unions reduced transfer rates and whether such effects vanished with the increasing acceptance of consensual unions.
Second, further potentially important variables were not available in our data. For example, we lacked longitudinal information on relationship characteristics, although it has been suggested that emotional closeness and residential proximity influence functional support in intergenerational relationships (Silverstein et al. 1995; McGarry and Schoeni 1997) . With regard to transfer motives, one important omission concerns children's economic resources. For example, data on children's income and wealth at the time of marriage could help disentangling need-related motives such as altruism from motives that are not related to need. Although the SOEP collects data on income at each survey year, our analyses using retrospective data would have required information about income and wealth from the years of receiving transfers.
Third, we had to draw on yearly-based data. More differentiated information on the temporal sequence of events and transfer receipt could alter our conclusions regarding Hypothesis 1b. We were only able to control for the year before a marriage. A large gift from parents, however, could still precede the event of marriage even if marriage and transfer receipt occurred within the same year.
Overall, the prevalence of large inter vivos transfers appears to be rather low. Survivor function estimates indicate that only about a sixth of children receive a major gift from parents until the age of 60. These numbers suggest that although large inter vivos transfers are more likely to be given at family events, they are still rather uncommon. Possibly, the actual prevalence of major gifts is higher because financial assets -in particular "unearned wealth" such as gifts and bequests -might be underreported in surveys. However, it is important to note that our focus on major financial gifts does not imply that large inter vivos transfers represent the predominant type of intergenerational support at family events. The majority of parental transfers are given in a series of smaller and more frequent transfers. Those are typically measured by survey questions referring to all transfers received within a recall period of 12 months. Such measures include more comprehensive information on a variety of parental support arrangements that are related to family events as well. For example, Bhaumik (2006) used cross-sectional data from the 1996 wave of the SOEP to find that marriage, divorce and childbirth co-occurred with the receipt of smaller financial transfers. But parents may also provide alternative forms of social support instead of financial transfers, such as temporary housing support after a divorce or looking after young grandchildren. Using data from SHARE, Kohli and Albertini (2008) found that the presence of young children stimulated help from parents that was predominantly social support or a combination of financial and social support.
Additional research is needed to further test and refine the conceptual model linking events in adult children's lives and the timing of intergenerational transfers. In the present study, we focused on family events. Other events that should be considered in future research include, for example, the end of education, leaving home and the beginning of employment, but also adverse life events such as unemployment and the onset of chronic illnesses. In addition, other dimensions influencing the distribution of transfers within families require further investigation. For example, our analysis revealed that women had lower chances of receiving large gifts than men, at least in the case of receiving real estate. These differences, however, may be leveled out by processes not observed in the present study. Unequal gift giving, for example, could be later compensated for by the division of bequests. Testing such considerations requires expanding the life course perspective. Most importantly, analyzing the period after transfers are received would present an opportunity to investigate processes of intergenerational exchange. The most promising approach, we believe, is using data from long-term panel studies providing yearly-updated information on a variety of transfers in both directions. This would allow for the exploration of patterns of intergenerational transfers over the entire shared lifetime of parents and their adult children from a comprehensive life course perspective.
Notes
1. The only exception in the former German inheritance legislation concerned gifts that a child received less than 10 years before the parent's death. Those gifts were credited against the statutory share of the bequest.
2. This category does not differentiate between transfers of building sites, transfers of farmland or forest, and transfers of houses. In Germany, the latter almost always coincides with land transfers.
3. Due to oversampling of East Germans in the SOEP, this share is much higher than the proportion of East Germans in unified Germany.
4. These multipliers are calculated by exp(β).
5. When estimating this interaction effect for gifts of real estate, the standard errors became too large. For gifts of money, the interaction effect could be estimated, but it was insignificant. Therefore, we only present the more parsimonious specification in models 2 and 3.
6. In event history models, the significance of parameter estimates depends on the number of events. These numbers differ between Model 2 (307 events) and Model 3 (189 events). Therefore, we tested whether significant parameter estimates from Model 2 lose their significance when randomly drawing samples out of those surveyed in the ratio of 189 to 307. All effects observed remained significant. The same applies to the models presented in Table 4 .
